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element with another, the size of the policy portfolio 
remains stable. Likewise, if states drop a policy  
element without introducing a replacement, a policy 
portfolio reduces in size. Accordingly, our notion  
of policy accumulation is strongly connected to the 
concept of policy layering (Schickler, 2001; Thelen, 
2003). Rooted in the historical-institutionalist school 
of thought, policy layering describes a process of  
institutional evolution in which institutional arrange-
ments are gradually enhanced with new elements 
while the pre-existing institutional structure, which 
has become entrenched through the vested interests 
defending it (Pierson, 2000), remains stable. In line 
with Thelen (2003), we argue that such processes of 
policy layering are pervasive in modern democracies, 
and while the motivations that drive policy layering 
are manifold, policy layering inevitably leads to policy 
accumulation.
Given our conceptualization of policy accumulation as 
the accumulation of policy elements, we need a sound 
operational understanding of how we conceive of  
policy elements. For our purposes, a policy element 
constitutes the combination of a policy target and a 
policy instrument. While policy targets define what  
or who is being addressed by a new policy, policy  
instruments define how the target is being addressed 
(Eladis et al., 2005). We are not interested in the  
restrictiveness or generosity of a certain policy – the 
setting of the policy instruments – since changes in  
instrument settings do not contribute to the size of the 
policy portfolio. Instead, we are interested in the  
introduction of new policy instruments and/or the  
widening of the scope of existing policy instruments 
to new policy targets.
The analysis of policy accumulation has been based on 
Starting Point and Research Objectives
The starting point of the project was the observation 
of a seemingly paradoxical development of expanding 
policy outputs and policy complexity in many modern 
democracies, although governments generally face  
increasing constraints when trying to extend their  
involvement and intervention in many policy sectors. 
Obviously, governments are actually trying to balance 
the mismatch between limitations of supply and gro-
wing demand by increased policy complexity; implying 
that governments might achieve less by doing more.  
The central objective of the project was to investigate 
this general development in more detail, focusing on 
the comparative analysis of environmental, social, and 
morality policies. More specifically, two questions 
have been addressed: 
(1) To what extent is our impression of growing policy 
complexity correct and how can we actually measure 
and explain complexity in the first place? 
(2) What are the consequences of growing complexity 
for democratic legitimacy? 
Analytical Approach and Research Design
To address the above questions, we first needed to  
develop an analytical concept for investigating policy 
complexity across countries, policy sectors and over 
time. In so doing, we relied on the concept of policy 
accumulation. We regard policy accumulation as  
the end result of a continuous addition of new policy 
elements to existing policy portfolios without the  
compensatory reduction of already existing policy  
elements. In other words, policy accumulation occurs 
whenever states adopt new rules without abolishing 
others. If lawmakers decide to replace one policy  
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the quantitative analysis of different datasets compiled 
in different previous projects by the researcher in  
residence and his group. The latter include the EU and 
ERC-funded projects ENVIPOLCON, CONSENSUS, 
and MORAPOL. In order to analyze the effects on  
policy accumulation, we relied on a combination of 
quantitative and quali tative methods (case studies).
Measuring Policy Complexity: Policy Accumulation 
and Democratic Overload
Systematic data on regulatory output, qualitative  
inquiry, and personal experience all confirm that  
policy accumulation is the common trend that reaches 
across policy sectors and democratic systems. This 
development is most intuitive in the context of envi-
ronmental policy. While there have been only few  
environmental policies in the 1960s, today most  
de veloped democracies have accumulated a signi-
ficant inventory of environmental rules and regula-
tions. 
Though expansion and accumulation may be unsur-
prising in environmental policy, it is interesting to  
note that this regulatory trend is evident even in the 
context of social welfare state policies, a sector that 
has been under constant consolidation and dismant-
ling pressures due to constrained public budgets.  
One reason for this is that the regulatory state has in 
many ways ‘come to the rescue of the welfare state’ 
with the adoption of rent control measures or mini-
mum wage provisions (Levi-Faur, 2014). Another rea-
son is that in many instances, in order to save money, 
the eligibility of social programs is restricted by  
additional conditions and exemptions. Even in the  
context of so-called morality policies that comprise the 
regulation of prostitution or gambling, for example, 
the regulatory trend is one of accumulation instead of 
change or dismantling. This has a lot to do with the 
ways in which many of these areas have been libera-
lized. Once prohibitions on prostitution are loosened 
and it is treated like a regular service industry, the 
sector obtains industry regulations that are similar  
to those of other sectors. 
Generally speaking, we see that government pro-
grams, subsidies, tax-based incentives, information 
campaigns, offers, rules, and sanctions continue to 
pile up in modern democracies. And we should be 
happy that they do. In many ways, this accumulation 
of public policy measures is the hard-fought result  
of democratically led battles whose aims were to  
mitigate pressing societal, economic, or environmen-
tal problems. While Pierson and Hacker suggest that 
many people forget about the important benefits of  
regulation and government intervention (Pierson & 
Hacker, 2016), we are confident that most people are 
happy not to live in a country that still trusts in the  
social policy portfolio of the 1870s or the environ-
mental policy portfolio of the 1950s. Accumulating  
public policies has achieved substantial improve- 
ments in public health, social protection, water quality 
of rivers and lakes, and many areas of individual 
rights.
And yet the continuous expansion and differentiation 
of policy portfolios is a highly ambivalent process,  
representing the political manifestation of progress  
on the one hand while demanding significant invest-
ment in administration, analysis, and communication 
on the other. Criticism of continuous government  
expansion had its heydays in the 1980s, when the  
political right, with Margaret Thatcher and Ronald  
Reagan acting as leading figures, aggressively decried 
the ‘evils of government expansion’. While these ac-
tors described central aspects of policy accumulation, 
they framed the problem one-dimensionally. Essenti-
ally, this accumulation was criticized as a move to-
wards the ‘nanny state’, which cuts deep into individu-
als’ freedoms and thereby undermines entrepreneurial 
drive and competition as the foundation of economic 
prosperity. In part, this rhetoric still persists, and  
attempts to engage in de-bureaucratization and to  
cut red tape have left their institutional marks in  
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most countries in the form of regulatory control 
boards. 
The debate between proponents and opponents of  
deregulation seems to be largely stuck in this period 
of the 1980s. We believe this to be problematic for  
two reasons. First, the problems that come with  
continuous policy accumulation and rule growth are 
more far-reaching than is suggested by that debate. 
These include the economic downside of regulatory 
burdens on businesses that hamper entrepreneurship 
and business development, as well as the sheer volume 
and complexity of policies that threaten the timely and 
non-selective implementation and enforcement by 
frontline bureaucrats, limit our ability to engage in  
policy substance instead of politics, and challenge  
our ability to develop evidence-based refinements of 
highly complex policy mixes. The diagnosis of the 
1980s is too narrow, however, focusing only on the 
problems of policy accumulation while ignoring its 
enormous benefits, and the prescribed treatment – 
large-scale deregulation – was flawed. While research 
into the termination of government programs and  
public policies has shown that deregulation is very  
difficult to achieve, our knowledge about the benefits 
of public policy leads us to question whether its  
achievement is, in fact, desirable. Consequently, our 
project proposes investing in ways to strengthen our 
democratic infrastructure that carries the weight of 
accumulating policies in order to ensure that policy 
accumulation is sustainable. 
To some extent, this project also touches on the deba-
te on government overload and ‘ungovernability’ that 
was prominent in the 1970s (Crozier et al., 1975; King, 
1975; Rose, 1979). The central concern in this debate 
was that democratic governments were ill equipped  
to respond to the increasing and increasingly wide-
spread demands that society directed at them. After 
all, democratic policy making came to be seen as being 
responsible for solving problems in almost every as-
pect of life. Overburdened with these demands, many 
analytical observers feared that democracies’ ability  
to make decisions would diminish. This in turn would 
undermine their perceived legitimacy and consequent-
ly lead to democracies’ decline. Furthermore, demo-
cracies’ legitimacy was seen to be in danger because 
it largely relied on the ability to equitably distribute 
wealth created by strong economic growth. Declining 
rates of economic growth would eventually leave de-
mocracies unable to develop strong political respon-
ses to the societal problems capitalist societies tend  
to develop. Instead, states would be restricted to  
incremental refinements and rearrangements of  
established policies, mechanisms, and programs that 
would be increasingly unfit to mitigate problems and 
generate legitimacy for democratic government (Offe, 
1972). 
So far, these fears do not seem to have materialized; 
over the past few decades, we have witnessed an  
increase rather than a decline in democratic govern-
ments across the globe (Huntington, 1993). In fact, 
democratic governments seem to have been quite  
resilient in the face of these pressures. They have  
responded to increasingly heterogeneous societal  
demands by branching out considerably into all  
aspects of life and society. And despite – and partly 
because off – declining rates of economic growth,  
they have managed to increase considerably the  
overall volume of law and to continuously fill their  
policy portfolios. 
We believe that the resulting pile up of accumulated 
rules and policies has started to create problems of 
overload. In contrast to the above-mentioned overload 
problems discussed in the 1970s, the overload problems 
we focus on here do not so much affect policy makers 
and their ability to make decisions as they threaten to 
overburden our very administrative systems and the 
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Consequences: A Democratic Responsiveness Trap? 
The key virtue – and problem – of modern democra-
cies is their responsiveness to societal demands.  
Ignoring societal demands is not an option for demo-
cratic governments if they are interested in staying  
in power. While autocratic leaders can afford to by-
pass the popular will (at least until the threshold of  
rebellion is reached), democratic governments risk  
losing their power if they fail to live up to the expecta-
tions of the populace. Responsiveness is the main 
source of legitimacy for democratic governments. 
And despite the unavoidable criticism of not meeting 
societal demands, most democratic governments have 
been remarkably responsive and productive over re-
cent decades. Although policy dismantling and termi-
nation has proved to be very difficult (Pierson, 1994; 
Bauer et al., 2012; Bauer & Adam, forthcoming), policy 
makers have found ways in many areas to respond to 
societal demands by amendment and accumulation. 
As we will argue, this process of continuous policy  
accumulation tends to come with three noteworthy 
side effects that threaten to undermine the input and 
output legitimacy of democratic government (Scharpf, 
2003). 
First, continuous policy accumulation has created in-
creasingly complex policy mixes and a stock of rules 
and programmes that is increasingly difficult to grasp 
in its comprehensiveness. In other words, the sub-
stance of public policy has become more and more 
complex. While expert arenas of policy debate might 
be able to keep up with the complexity of the subs-
tance of policies, the characteristics of arenas of pub-
lic debate, such as most television formats, leave them 
unfit to carry this level of complexity. In this way, the 
process of policy accumulation threatens to crowd out 
policy substance from public political debates. The  
resulting tendency to talk politics instead of policy 
challenges the input legitimacy of political decisions. 
This is where we see the responsiveness trap click 
first. 
Second, democratic responsiveness is often focused 
more on the delivery of new policy outputs than on 
their implementation. Once individual laws and  
regulations are adopted, they move off the desks of 
policy makers and onto the desks of lower-level front-
line bureaucrats, where implementation burdens  
accumulate, very often without adequate financial and 
staff resources to handle the additional workload and 
complexity. As implementation burdens continue to 
accumulate, the prevalence of administrative backlog 
and selective implementation increases. As the risk of 
generating systematically increasing implementation 
deficits threatens the output legitimacy of democratic 
governments, the responsiveness trap clicks a second 
time. 
Third, the output legitimacy of democratic govern-
ments relies on perceptions of policy effectiveness 
and therefore on our interpretation of the results of 
policy evaluations. In order to evaluate increasingly 
complex policy mixes in a way that enables us to  
refine these mixes based on evidence, we require 
knowledge not only about their effectiveness collec-
tively but also about the effectiveness of the individual 
elements within policy mixes – how the effects of  
one element within the mix are conditioned by other 
elements within that same mix. This knowledge is  
crucial to refining domestic policy mixes and to for-
ming educated guesses about effectiveness when an 
element is transferred into a foreign policy mix. 
To some extent, the increasing complexity of these 
mixes creates methodological challenges because of 
the growing number of policy-inherent parameters 
that have to be handled in such evaluations. More  
importantly, however, this complexity creates a com-
municative challenge. Conditional effects, particularly 
when multiple conditions apply at the same time,  
are inherently difficult to analyse, interpret, and com-
municate to decision makers. While evaluations strive 
to contextualize results and identify highly complex 
conditional effects, such efforts themselves can often 
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undermine the ability of these results to affect de-
cision makers’ thinking about policy effectiveness.  
We fear that this leads to a paradoxical situation  
in which increasingly sophisticated and nuanced  
evidence about policy effectiveness will matter less 
and less to policy makers’ thinking because of its very 
sophistication and nuance. Policy accumulation calls 
for the identification of highly complex conditional  
effects. Changing policy makers’ prior beliefs about 
policy effectiveness tends to be difficult when results 
are blurred by nuance and conditionality. Where it  
becomes increasingly difficult to interpret and com-
municate evidence about the effectiveness of an  
individual response to societal demands due to the 
highly complex interactions of this response with all 
the other responses given in the past, evidence-based 
refinements of complex policy mixes become increa-
singly difficult to achieve, and the responsiveness trap 
clicks a third time. 
In combination, these three mechanisms tie the  
immediate responsiveness to societal demands to  
the long-term threat to the legitimacy of democratic 
government. From this perspective, responsiveness  
to societal demands appears to be a two-edged sword 
that leaves policy makers stuck in a responsiveness 
trap: being unresponsive will undermine their legiti-
macy, while being responsive – and thereby accumula-
ting policies and regulations – will slowly and silently 
overburden the administrative, evaluative, and com-
municative capacities that help support the legitimacy 
of democratic government in the long run. Figure 1  
illustrates this argument graphically.
Implications for Future Research
Our research has been conducted at a time when the 
worlds of politics and academia worry about democracy. 
These concerns are narrowly tied to the emergence  
of populist movements and parties, which combine  
nationalist, xenophobic, and protectionist tendencies 
with a stunning disregard for scientific evidence or 
factual knowledge. These populist actors are seen as 
exogenous threats to democratic governance. With 
this project, we shed light on the continuous process 
of policy accumulation as an endo genous threat to  
democratic governance. While we do not try to claim 
that policy accumulation promotes the emergence of 
populist movements, we do believe that the process  
of policy accumulation in many ways creates a political 
environment within which these populist actors can 
Figure 1: The Responsiveness Trap
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thrive. Where selective implementation soars, evidence 
is increasingly difficult to process, and as an attentive 
public talks politics instead of policy, specific instances 
of frustration with the state might very well spill over 
into more generalised frustration with the state as 
such. Against this background, we should not be too 
surprised that it has proven rather easy to mobilise 
angry, frustrated, and uninformed citizens. 
Although policy accumulation has helped to create a 
comfortable environment for these foes of democracy, 
our findings should not be read as a call for policy dis-
mantling. Policy accumulation is the result of the de-
mocratic struggle for progress and modernisation that 
has, in the aggregate, made our lives better. Our goal 
should be to enable democratic systems to promote 
sustainable policy accumulation. Everyone is aware  
of the need to improve the financial sustainability of 
modern democracies. A similar awareness must now 
extend to the dangers of a lack of regulatory sustain-
ability.
Future research should address potential pathways  
of ensuring sustainable policy accumulation. In this  
regard we think that especially four factors should be 
considered in more detail: better vertical coordination 
between policy makers and frontline bureaucrats;  
investment in the public sector and its employees; 
civic education; and statistical literacy. 
The institutionalization of enhanced vertical coordina-
tion between policy makers and frontline bureaucrats 
could help avoid excessive policy accumulation in 
areas where implementation and enforcement are 
most problematic. Vertical coordination is institutiona-
lized when it takes place regularly and is acknow-
ledged as part of the job description of relevant policy 
makers and frontline bureaucrats. To some extent,  
calculation of compliance costs already helps to achieve 
some level of vertical coordination. This takes place, 
however, rather late in the legislative process. Conti-
nuous vertical coordination that allows for the ex-
change of information at the early stages of the legis-
lative or regulatory process would be more helpful in 
this regard. Even where additional implementation 
burdens cannot be avoided with this approach, it will 
equip frontline bureaucrats with a better chance to ob-
tain the resources and staff necessary to appropriately 
implement and enforce additional policies. 
Investment in the public sector and its employees – 
the people who bring public policies to life – is critical 
if we want public policies to work effectively. After all, 
their way of coping with increasing implementation 
burdens is essential to our overall ability to solve  
societal problems and to the experiences that citizens 
collect first hand with representatives of the govern-
ment. 
Civic education can help us carry an increasing level 
of policy-inherent complexity without substantial  
legitimacy problems. At the moment, education about 
democracy and politics focuses overwhelmingly on 
identifying political institutions and explaining how 
they interact. Policy-specific knowledge plays a much 
smaller role. How does our pension system work? 
How has our educational policy changed over time? 
And how does our tax system differ from the tax  
system of other countries? Many of these questions 
seem too complex to be taught to younger students. 
Yet knowledge about them is essential if we hope  
to raise educated citizens who are able to follow in-
creasingly complex policy debates, ask the right kind 
of questions, and make informed political choices. 
Finally, we believe that statistical literacy is essential. 
We have tried to describe the difficulties involved in 
interpreting complex conditional results in an approp-
riate way. In a world of big data, substantial policy 
complexity, increasing statistical and methodological 
sophistication, and a pressure to base policy decisions 
on evidence, the ability to assess the robustness of 
claims about cause and effect and the ability to inter-
pret complex descriptive statistics is increasingly im-
portant. Current trends towards more sophisticated 
approaches in data visualization will be very helpful  
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in this regard, since they help us to communicate  
complex results and relationships more easily. At  
the same time, in a world that runs on data, knowing 
how to analyse and interpret data analyses is a basic 
set of skills that we need to integrate into our school 
systems much more aggressively.
Guest Researchers and Workshop
During our stay at CAS, our research benefited tre-
mendously from the exchange with a range of highly 
distinguished guest researchers. With Carmine Bianchi 
(University of Palermo), we discussed how the notion 
of policy complexity fits with existing research in the 
area of system dynamics. The establish ed contacts 
with Carmine Bianchi will certainly also prove valuable 
for future research collaborations.  
Together with Guy B. Peters (University of Pittsburgh) 
we drafted a paper which is currently under review at 
the Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis. In the 
paper, we investigate how barriers to vertical policy 
coordination aggravate the negative consequences  
of policy accumulation. The cooperation with Guy B. 
Peters, who is one of the most experienced and most 
cited researchers in public administration, was also 
particularly beneficial for the junior members of the 
research team. Furthermore, Isabelle Engeli (University 
of Bath) was a great source of inspiration for our book 
manuscript, as she provided us with many constructive 
comments based on her theoretical perspective on the 
policy process. Finally, we profited enormously from the 
stay of Christian Breunig (University of Konstanz) and 
of André Bächtiger (University of Stuttgart). Christian 
Breunig read the early draft of our book manuscript 
very carefully, and his comments helped us to improve 
the book significantly.
Our CAS workshop “What Next for the State? General 
Trends and Challenges for Democratic Policy-Making”
was extra ordinarily helpful for us, as it enabled us to 
receive final comments on our book manuscript from  
a distinguished set of scholars. Over the summer, we 
engaged with these comments and integrated them 
into our manuscript. Next to Christian Breunig, we  
received useful feedback from all participants of the 
workshop: Frank Nullmeier (University of Bremen), 
Esther Vers luis (University of Maastricht), Fritz Sager 
(University of Bern), and Peter John (King’s College 
London). Yet, the workshop was not only beneficial  
for our book project, but also helped us to establish  
a network of scholars whose work is closely related  
to our approach. The papers presented by the work-
shop participants spoke to the general theme of our 
research stay and thus were very inspirational for us.
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